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In the Hotelling framework, the equilibrium first-degree discriminatory prices are all 
lower than the equilibrium uniform price. When firms’ locations are fixed, price 
discrimination emerges as the unique equilibrium in a game in which every firm may 
commit not to discriminate before setting the price schedule. This paper assumes 
endogenous locations and shows that uniform pricing emerges as the unique equilibrium 
in a game in which every firm may commit not to discriminate before choosing where 
to locate in the market. Price discrimination still is the unique equilibrium outcome 
when firms may commit only after the location choice.   
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1. Introduction  
 
Price discrimination is a widely used business practice. However, in oligopoly it may 
be possible that the equilibrium discriminatory prices are all lower than the equilibrium 
uniform price. This phenomenon is called all-out competition
1. When all-out 
competition occurs, equilibrium profits under the discriminatory price regime are lower 
than the equilibrium profits under the uniform price regime.  
All-out competition typically emerges in the Hotelling (1929) framework with linear 
or quadratic transportation costs
2. Thisse and Vives (1988) have studied the case of 
first-degree price discrimination within the Hotelling’s (1929) model assuming that the 
firms are exogenously located at the endpoints of the market. First, they show that when 
firms can perfectly price discriminate and simultaneously choose the price schedule, 
uniform pricing is never an equilibrium. Then, Thisse and Vives (1988) assume a two-
stage game, where in the first stage each firm has the possibility to announce that it will 
not price discriminate, while in the second stage the price schedules are effectively set. 
For example, a firm may announce in the first stage that it would not hold sales or 
would not issue coupons. Of course, such announcements have to be credible. There are 
a lot of practices that make these announcements credible: the most-favoured nation 
clause
3 is one of these practices. Thisse and Vives (1988) show that even when every 
firm may credible commit not to discriminate before setting the price schedule, the 
discriminatory prices still arise in equilibrium, since no-commitment is the dominant 
strategy for each firm in the first stage of the game conditioned on the equilibrium path 
in the second stage of the game. This situation gives rise to a typical Prisoner Dilemma: 
both firms would be better off setting uniform prices, but the dominant strategy of each 
firm induces the discriminatory equilibrium, that in turn yields lower profits.      
The aim of this paper is to test whether Thisse and Vives’ (1988) result still holds 
when the locations of the firms are endogenous. First of all, allowing firms to choose 
where to locate in the market, we obtain that the location-price equilibrium with perfect 
price discrimination is characterized by a less than maximal differentiation degree: in 
                                                 
1 Corts (1998). 
2 Ulph and Vulkan (2000). 
3 The most-favoured nation clause engages a firm to offer a consumer the same price as its other 
consumers: if the clause is not respected, the firm must pay back the consumer the difference between the 
price he effectively paid and the lowest price fixed by the firm.    2
fact, firms locate at 1/4 and 3/4. All-out competition occurs. A second step of the 
analysis consists in supposing a three-stage game. In the first stage of the game, firms 
simultaneously choose where to locate in the market. In the second stage of the game 
each firm decides whether to commit not to price discriminate or not to commit: if a 
firm has committed, it is obliged to set the same price for all consumers when the 
competition in price arises; if a firm has not committed, it competes with unrestricted 
price schedules. In the third stage the firms set simultaneously the price schedules. We 
show that there exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, which is characterized by 
price discrimination. Therefore, even with endogenous locations, discriminatory prices 
arise in equilibrium. Finally, we suppose a change in the timing of the three-stage game. 
That is, in the first stage of the game, each firm commits or does not commit; in the 
second stage the firms simultaneously choose the location in the market; in the third 
stage the firms set simultaneously the price schedules. Interestingly, in this case the 
(unique) sub-game perfect equilibrium is characterized by uniform pricing: both firms 
commit in the first stage, maximally differentiate in the second stage and set uniform 
prices in the third stage. No Prisoner Dilemma is present. The intuition behind this 
result is the following. When the commitment decision is taken for given locations of 
the firms (first timing), the only effect of commitment is to reduce the firm’s flexibility 
on setting prices. Therefore, the dominant strategy for each firm is no-commitment, and 
the Thisse and Vives’ (1988) result still is valid. Instead, when the commitment decision 
affects not only the price decision but also the location decision (second timing), each 
firm anticipates that its decision to commit will induce a higher equilibrium 
differentiation degree, and this makes profitable for each firm to commit, even if the 
flexibility in setting price is reduced: in this case, the Thisse and Vives (1988) result 
does not hold.       
This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the model and we 
briefly recall the well-known location-price equilibrium under the hypothesis of 
uniform price regime. In section 3 we analyse the location-price equilibrium when the 
firms can perfectly price discriminate. In section 4 we analyze the three-stage game with 
the two different timings. Section 5 concludes.  
 
   3
2. Uniform price  
 
Assume a linear market of length 1. Consumers are uniformly distributed along the 
segment. Define with  ] 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  the location of each consumer. Each point in the linear 
market represents a certain variety of a given good. For a consumer positioned at a 
given point, the preferred variety is represented by the point in which the consumer is 
located: the more the variety is far from the point in which the consumer is located, the 
less it is appreciated by the consumer. Each consumer consumes no more than 1 unit of 
the good. Define with v the maximum price that a consumer is willing to pay for buying 
his preferred variety. Suppose that v is equal for all consumers. Suppose further that v is 
large enough to guarantee that each consumer always buys the good.  
There are two firms, A and B, competing in the market. Both firms have identical 
constant marginal costs, c, and zero fixed costs. The firms’ decision concerning where 
to locate coincides with the decision of which variety to produce. Define with a the 
location chosen by firm A and with b the location chosen by firm B. Without loss of 
generality, assume:  1 0 ≤ ≤ ≤ b a . Define with 
A
p  the uniform price set by firm A and 
with 
B
p  the uniform price set by firm B 
4. 
The utility of a consumer depends on v, on the price set by the firm from which he 
buys, and on the distance between his preferred variety and the variety produced by the 
firm. We assume quadratic transportation costs. Define with t, equal for all consumers, 
the importance attributed by the consumer to the distance between his preferred variety 
and the variety offered by the firm. The utility of a consumer located at x when he buys 
from firm A is given by: 
2 ) ( a x t p v u
A
x − − − = , while the utility of a consumer located 
at x when he buys from firm B is given by: 
2 ) ( b x t p v u
B
x − − − = . Define with  * x  the 
consumer which is indifferent between buying from firm A or from firm B for a given 
                                                 
4 Given the interpretation of the linear market that we are adopting, the “transportation costs” are 
necessarily sustained by the consumers: therefore, prices are f.o.b.. However, the linear market can also 
have a “spatial” interpretation: in this case each point of the segment represents a point in the physical 
space. Since the distance between a consumer and the firm implies now effective transportation costs, two 
pricing methods are possible: f.o.b. prices, when the transportation costs are sustained by the consumer 
which goes and takes up the product at the firm’s mill, and delivered prices, when the transportation costs 
are sustained by the firm that carries the product from the mill to the consumer. Thisse and Vives (1988) 
adopt a spatial interpretation of the market and assume delivered prices.       4
couple of locations, a and b, and for a given couple of uniform prices, 
A
p  and 
B
p .  
Equating the utility in the two cases and solving for x it follows: 
 
) ( 2 2
*
a b t







=                                      
 
Given the uniform distribution of the consumers,  * x  is the demand function of firm 
A and  * 1 x −  is the demand function of firm B. It is well known that in a two-stage 
game in which firms first choose locations and then choose the uniform price, the 
unique sub-game perfect equilibrium implies maximal differentiation, as the following 
proposition indicates:  
 
Proposition 1 (D’Aspremont et al. 1979): in a two-stage game in which the firms first 
simultaneously decide where to locate and then simultaneously decide the [uniform] 
price, there is a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium, defined by  0 *= a  and 1 *= b,  
and  c t p p
B A
+ = = * *.  
 
Given the equilibrium locations and the equilibrium prices, the equilibrium profits 
for each firm are:  2 t
B A = Π = Π .   
 
 
3. Discriminatory prices 
 
We study now the location-price equilibrium when both firms can perfectly price 
discriminate between consumers. We suppose a two-stage game, in which the firms first 
decide where to locate and then compete on prices. Before to start, note that the fact that 
the firms have the possibility to price discriminate does not imply that the firms 
effectively price discriminate: a firm may decide to price uniformly even if it can price 
discriminate. In the following we show that when firms can price discriminate, they do 
it. Consider a consumer located in x. Define with 
J
x p  the price charged by firm 
B A J , =  to the consumer x. The utility of that consumer when he buys from firm A is   5
given by: 
2 ) ( a x t p v u
A
x x − − − = , while his utility when he buys from firm B is given by: 
2 ) ( b x t p v u
B
x x − − − = . Obviously, the consumer buys from the firm which gives him 
the higher utility. If the utility of the consumer is the same when he buys from firm A 
and when he buys from firm B, we suppose that he buys from the nearer firm
5. Suppose 
that consumer x is nearer to firm A than to firm B. For a given couple of firms’ locations 
and for a given price set by firm B, the best thing firm A can do is setting a price that 
gives the consumer the same utility he receives from firm B: this is the highest possible 
price that guarantees that consumer x buys from A. Suppose instead that the consumer x 
is nearer to firm B. For a given couple of firms’ locations and for a given price set by 
firm B, in order to serve consumer x the best thing firm A can do is giving him a slightly 
higher utility than the utility provided to him by firm B. Of course, an analogous 
reasoning holds for firm B. Therefore, defining with ε  a positive and infinitely small 
number and recalling that a price lower than the marginal cost entails a loss, the best-
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                  (1) 
 
Note that the best-reply price schedule of each firm depends on x. Therefore, the 
dominant strategy of each firm entails price discrimination. This means that when a firm 
can price discriminate, it price discriminates.  
The following proposition defines the equilibrium price schedule for any couple of 
locations. 
 
Proposition 2: when the firms can perfectly price discriminate between the consumers, 
the equilibrium prices in the second stage of the game are the following: 
 
                                                 
5 This assumption is common in spatial models, and it is necessary to avoid the technicality of ε-
equilibrium concepts when both firms price discriminate.    6
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) , ( * a x t b x t c b a p
A
x − − − + =      if       2 ) ( b a x + ≤    and 
c b a p
A
x = ) , ( *                             if      2 ) ( b a x + ≥  
2 2 ) ( ) ( ) , ( * b x t a x t c b a p
B
x − − − + =     if       2 ) ( b a x + ≥    and 
c b a p
B
x = ) , ( *                               if        2 ) ( b a x + ≤  
 
Proof. Suppose that x is near to A, that is,  2 ) ( b a x + < . Consider firm B. First, we 
show that   c p
B
x >  cannot be an equilibrium. When  c p
B
x > , the best-reply of firm A 
consists in setting: 




x − − − + = . It follows that the optimal price for 




x p p ' , that is always higher than c due to the fact that 
B
x p  is higher 
than c by hypothesis and ε  is an infinitely small and positive number by definition. 
Therefore,  c p
B
x >  cannot be an equilibrium, because firm B would obtain higher profits 




x > − = ε ' . We show now that  c p
B
x =  is an equilibrium. The best-reply 
of firm A  is: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( a x t b x t c p
A
x − − − + = . With such a price firm B  obtains zero 
profits from consumer x, which buys from firm A, but it has no incentive to change the 
price, because increasing the price it would continue to obtain zero profits, and setting a 
price lower than the marginal costs would entail a loss. Since firm A is setting the price 
indicated by the best-reply function, it is setting the optimal price by definition. It 
follows that 
2 2 ) ( ) ( a x t b x t c p
A
x − − − + =  and  c p
B
x =  represents the (unique) price 
equilibrium. The proof for  2 ) ( b a x + >  is symmetric to the proof for  2 ) ( b a x + < . 
Finally, when the consumer is at the same distance from the two firms, that is 
2 ) ( b a x + = , the standard Bertrand’s result holds: the unique price equilibrium when 
two undifferentiated firms compete on price is represented by both firms setting a price 
equal to the marginal cost.                                                                                                ■ 
 
The equilibrium locations in the first stage of the game are defined in the next 
proposition: 
 
Proposition 3: in the first stage of the game the unique Nash equilibrium is given by 
4 1 *= a  and  4 3 *= b.     7
 
Proof. Using Proposition (2), the firms’ profits can be written directly as functions of 
a and b. Then: 
4 ) )( ( ) , (
2 b a a b t b a
A + − = Π                                                  (A1)        
4 ) 2 )( ( ) , (
2 b a a b t b a
B − − − = Π                                             (A2)      
Maximizing them with respect to a and b it follows: 
0 4 ) 2 3 (
2 2 = − − = ∂ Π ∂ ab a b t a
A                                           (A3) 
0 4 ) 4 8 2 3 (
2 2 = + − + − = ∂ Π ∂ b ab a b t b
B                              (A4) 
Consider equation (A3) as a function of b. This equation has two solutions:  a b 3 =  and 
a b − = . The second solution is impossible, since neither a or b can be negative, and 
0 = = b a  does not solve equation (A4). Therefore it must be:  a b 3 = . Substituting it in 
equation (A4) and solving with respect to a we obtain two solutions:  4 1 = a  and 
2 1 = a . The second solution is impossible, since we have  1 2 3 3 > = = a b , which is 
impossible. Therefore, the only admissible values which solve the system defined by 
equations (A3) and (A4) are  4 1 * = a  and  4 3 * = b .                                                        ■ 
 
The following proposition compares the location-price equilibrium when perfect 




a)  All prices are lower under perfect price discrimination than under uniform 
price. Therefore, profits are lower under perfect price discrimination than under 
uniform price. 
b)  The surplus of each consumer is higher under perfect price discrimination than 
under uniform price, and the more the consumer is located near to the middle the 
higher is the difference. 




                                                 
6 Lederer and Hurter (1986) obtain the same result assuming delivered instead of f.o.b. prices.   8
Proof.  
a) Substituting  4 1 = a  and  4 3 = b  into the equilibrium discriminatory price 
schedules, it follows:  ) 2 1 ( * x t c p
A
x − + = , ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ ∀x  and  ) 2 1 ( * − + = x t c p
B
x , 
] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ ∀x . Then,  = = * *
B A
p p * ) 2 1 (
A





p * ) 2 1 (
B
x p x t c t c = − + > + ,  ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ ∀x . Under price discrimination total 
profits are:  4 t
D = Π , while under uniform price they are:  t
U = Π . Then: 
0 4 3 < − = Π − Π = ∆Π t
U D
. 
b) Under price discrimination, the surplus of a consumer located at  ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  is 
given by: 




x − − − − − = − − − = , while the surplus 
of a consumer located at  ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ x  is given by:  = − − − =





2 ) 4 3 ( ) 2 1 ( x t x t c v − − − − − = . Under uniform price, the surplus of a consumer located 
at  ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ x  is:  = − − − =
2 ) * ( * x a t p v CS
U A U
x
2 tx t c v − − − , while the surplus of a 
consumer located at  ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ x  is:  = − − − =
2 ) * ( * x b t p v CS
U B U
x  





x CS CS CS − ≡ ∆ . It follows that:  = ∆CS 0 ) 16 15 2 ( > + x t ,  ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ ∀x , and 
0 ) 16 31 2 3 ( > + − = ∆ x t CS , ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ ∀x . Moreover,  0 > ∂ ∆ ∂ x CS ] 2 1 , 0 [ ∈ ∀x  and 
0 < ∂ ∆ ∂ x CS   ] 1 , 2 1 [ ∈ ∀x . 
c) Since the output is the same under the uniform price regime and the discriminatory 
price regime and the prices have only a redistributive effect, total welfare depends only 
on transportation costs, which in turn are determined by the equilibrium locations. 
Define with a ˆ  and  b ˆ  the optimal locations from the total welfare point of view. They 
are simply:  = ) ˆ , ˆ ( b a = CT min arg   { } ∫ ∫ − + − =
1 2
0
2 ) ( ( ) ( ( min arg
x
x
dz b z t dz a z t , where the 
bracketed expression indicates the total transportation costs. The proof has two steps: 
first we calculate the optimal sharing of consumers, and then we calculate the optimal 
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0 2 2






=                9






2 ) ( ) ( ) , ( b a
b a
dx b x t dx a x t b a CT
4
) 4 4 3 4 (
2 2 3 2 3 b b b a b ab a t − + + + − −
     
0 4 ) 2 3 (
2 2 = + − = ∂ ∂ ab b a t a CT                                                  (A5) 
0 4 ) 4 8 3 2 (
2 2 = − + + − − = ∂ ∂ b a b ab t b CT                                  (A6) 
Since equations (A5) and (A6) coincide respectively with equations (A3) and (A4), the 
optimal locations a ˆ  and  b ˆ  coincide with the equilibrium locations  4 1 *= a  and 
4 3 *= b .                                                                                                                            ■  
 
The characteristics of the location-price equilibrium under the two pricing regimes 
are summarized in the following figure: 
 
 
    Figure 1: Illustration of Proposition 4                                                             
 
 
The thin and slopped lines in the bottom part of the graph represent the equilibrium 
prices set by the firms to each consumer under perfect price discrimination, while the 
bold and flat line represents the equilibrium prices under uniform price. It is immediate 
to see that all equilibrium discriminatory prices lay below the price line under the 
uniform price regime (all-out competition), and that the discriminatory prices decrease 
moving from consumers located at the endpoints to consumers located at the middle.  
From the consumers’ point of view, the surplus depends on the price paid and on the 
transportation costs sustained. The curves in the upper part of the graph describe the   10
surplus, gross of the price, of each consumer: the bold curve refers to the uniform price 
regime while the thin curve refers to the discriminatory price regime. Under the 
discriminatory price regime, the gross consumer surplus is maximum for consumers 
located at  4 1   and  4 3 , where the firms are located, and decreases the more the 
consumers are distant from these points. The minimum gross consumer surplus is at 
points 0,  2 1  and 1. Under the uniform price regime the gross consumer surplus is 
maximum at points 0 and 1 since firms are located at the endpoints of the segment, and 
it is minimum at  2 1 . The net consumer surplus is given by the difference between the 
upper curves and the price lines. In Proposition 4 we state that the surplus of each 
consumer is higher under price discrimination than under the uniform price regime. For 
consumers located between  8 1  and  8 7  this is immediate, since both the transportation 
costs and the prices decrease passing from the uniform price regime to the 
discriminatory price regime. For the other consumers we observe two opposite effects: 
the transportation costs increase under price discrimination (since the firms now are 
farther from these consumers) but the equilibrium prices decrease. In order to prove that 
even for these consumers the surplus is higher under the discriminatory price regime 
than under the uniform price regime it is sufficient to compare the surplus of the most 
external consumers in the two cases, since the consumers located at point 0 and 1 are 
the best-positioned consumers under the uniform price regime and the worst-positioned 
consumers under the discriminatory price regime. Under uniform pricing, the surplus of 
the consumers located at points 0 and 1 is equal to  c t v − − ; under perfect price 
discrimination, the same consumers obtain a surplus which is equal to  c t v − − 16 9.  
Since the surplus of these consumers increases passing from the uniform price regime to 
the discriminatory price regime, the same must be true for all other consumers.          
Finally, in Proposition 4 we state that total welfare is maximized under price 
discrimination. Since the total output is the same under the uniform price regime and the 
discriminatory price regime and since prices have only a redistributive function, total 
welfare depends only on the equilibrium locations which determine the total 
transportation costs sustained by the consumers: the equilibrium locations under price 
discrimination,  4 1   and  4 3 , minimize the total transportation costs and therefore 
maximize total welfare.   11
4. A three-stage model 
 
In section 3 we have shown that perfect price discrimination yields lower profits then 
uniform pricing. Now, suppose that each firm can announce its intention not to price 
discriminate before setting the price schedule. This commitment can be made credible 
by the adoption of business practices like the most-favoured nation clause. When firms’ 
locations are fixed, Thisse and Vives (1988) show that the possibility to commit before 
competing on prices does not alter the fundamental result: uniform pricing does not 
emerge in equilibrium. 
In this section we ask whether this result is still valid when locations are endogenous 
instead of exogenous. Therefore, we need to move from a two-stage model to a three-
stage model. Two timings are possible. Until now we have assumed that the final 
decision of the firms regards the price schedule to be applied, and we maintain this 
hypothesis. However, the decision regarding the commitment to uniform pricing may 
precede the decision on price and come after the decision on location, or it may precede 
both the decision on price and the decision on location: these two alternatives generate 
two different timings of the game. In what follows we solve the game in both cases. We 
show that when the decision on commitment is taken after the decision on location there 
exists a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium in which both firms price discriminate, 
while when the decision on commitment is taken before the decision on location there 




Timing: at time 1, both firms simultaneously choose the location along the market; at 
time 2 both firms simultaneously decide whether to commit (U) or not (D); at time 3 
both firms simultaneously choose the price schedule. 
 
We solve the game by backward induction. Consider the third stage of the game. We 
need to calculate the equilibrium prices when one firm has committed while the other 
has not. Suppose that firm A has committed at stage 2 while firm B has not committed. 
To obtain the best-response function of firm B we substitute 
A
x p  with 
A
p  into (1), since   12
now the price set by firm A must be the same for all consumers. For sake of clarity we 







+ ≥ − − − +
+ ≤ − − − − +
=
2 ) ( ] ; ) ( ) ( max[




b a x if c b x t a x t p





               (2) 
 
Consider a generic consumer x. If firm A sets a uniform price such that 
2 2 ) ( ) ( a x t b x t c p
A
− − − + > , firm B can always serve the consumer x setting the best-
response price defined by equation (2): therefore consumer x will always buy from firm 
B and firm A will obtain zero profits. In order to have a positive demand, firm A must 
set a uniform price of this type: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( a x t b x t c p
A
− − − + ≤ , which cannot be undercut 
by firm B without setting a price lower than the marginal cost, which would entail a 
loss. Therefore, the highest uniform price that firm B cannot undercut is given by: 
2 2 ) ( ) ( a x t b x t c p
A
− − − + = . Solving for x, we obtain the most at the right consumer 
served by firm A, *' x , which results to be:  2 ) ( ) ( 2 ) ( *' b a a b t p c x
A
+ + − − = . It follows 
that the demand of firm A is given by  *' x , while the demand of firm B is given by 
*' 1 x − . 
 
We state the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 5: if firm A has committed and firm B has not committed, the equilibrium 
prices in the third stage of the game are the following
7: 
 
2 ) )( ( ) , ( * a b b a t c b a p
A
− + + =  
 
                                                 
7 Unfortunately, ε -equilibrium cannot be avoided for a subset of consumers when one firm sets a 
uniform price and the other can perfectly price discriminate.   13
4 ) (
2 ) ( 4 ) (
2 ) (
) ( 2 2 ) )( (
) ( 2 2 ) )( (
) , ( *
b a x if
b a x b a if
b a x if
c
a b tx a b b a t c
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= ε  
      
If firm A has not committed and firm B has committed, the equilibrium prices in the 
third stage of the game are the following: 
 
4 ) (
4 ) ( 2 ) (
2 ) (
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Proof. Consider  = − = Π *' ) ( x c p
A A ]












− . Maximize it with 
respect to the price. It follows:  0



















2 ) ( *
2 2 a b t c p
A
− + = . Using this result into equation (2),  *
B
x p  follows immediately. 
The demonstration of the second part of Proposition 5 proceeds in the same way.         ■                              
 
We can write the firms’ profits directly as functions of a and b in the four possible 
cases: (U,U), (U,D), (D,U) and (D,D)








U  18 ) 2 )( (
2 b a a b t + + − ; 18 ) 4 )( (
2 b a a b t − − − 8 ) )( (
2 b a a b t + − ; 16 ) 4 )( (
2 b a a b t − − −
D  16 ) 2 )( (
2 b a a b t + + − ;  8 ) 2 )( (
2 b a a b t − − − 4 ) )( (
2 b a a b t + − ;  4 ) 2 )( (
2 b a a b t − − −
 
                                                 
8 The profit functions in (D,D) are simply the functions (A1) and (A2); the profit functions in (U,D) and 
(D,U) come from Proposition 5 (disregarding the ε ’s); the profit functions in (U,U) can be obtained by 
standard calculations (see, for example, Tirole, 1988, pag. 281).   14
It is immediate to see that, for any couple of locations, the dominant strategy of each 
firm is D. Given that at the second stage both firms do not commit, in the third stage 
they price discriminate and the equilibrium locations are given by Proposition 3. The 
following proposition summarizes and defines the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium: 
 
Proposition 6: in game 1, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is given by  4 1 *= a 
and  4 3 *= b,   (D,D), ) 2 1 ( * x t c p
A
x − + =  and  c p
B
x = *  for  2 1 ≤ x , and  c p
A
x = *  and 
) 2 1 ( * − + = x t c p
B
x  for  2 1 ≥ x .   
 
Proof.  Consider Table 1. If firm A chooses U, then firm B chooses D for any a and 
b, since  18 1 16 1 > . When firm A chooses D, firm B chooses D for any a and b, since 
8 1 4 1 > . Then, D is the dominant strategy for firm B. The same is true for firm A. It 
follows that in the second stage of the game the equilibrium is given by both firms 
choosing D. The rest of the Proposition follows from Propositions 2 and 3.                   ■                              
 
Proposition 6 shows that the Prisoner Dilemma is present in game 1, since both firms 
do not commit not to price discriminate even if this strategy is conducive to lower 
equilibrium profits. That is, assuming endogenous choice of the locations before the 
commitment decision does not alter the Thisse and Vives’ (1988) result: firms price 




Timing: at time 1 both firms simultaneously decide whether to commit or not; at time 
2 both firms simultaneously choose the location along the market; at time 3 both firms 
simultaneously choose the price schedule. 
   
As usual, in order to solve the game we start from the last stage. We already have the 
equilibrium prices and locations when both firms set a uniform price (Proposition 1) and 
when both price discriminate (Propositions 2 and 3). Moreover, we already know the 
equilibrium prices when one firm has committed and the other has not (Proposition 5).   15
Therefore, it remains to calculate the equilibrium locations in the sub-game that arises 
when only one firm has committed in the first stage. Equilibrium locations in this sub-
game are defined by the following proposition: 
 
Proposition 7: if at the first stage firm A has chosen U and firm B has chosen D, the 
equilibrium locations at the second stage are given by  3 1 *= a  and  1 *= b ; if at the first 
stage  firm A has chosen D and firm B has chosen U, the equilibrium locations at the 
second stage are given by  0 *= a  and  3 2 *= b.   
 
Proof. Maximize the profit functions in (U,D) of Table 1. It follows: 
8 ) 2 3 (
2 2 ab a b t a
A − − = ∂ Π ∂  and  (4 )(4 3 ) 16
B bt ab a b ∂Π ∂ = − − + − . Consider the 
latter equation. Since it is always positive, firm B locates at the right extremity of the 
market: that is,  1 = b . Substitute it into the first equation and solve. There are two 
solutions:  3 1 = a  and  1 − = a . Since the latter solution is impossible, the equilibrium 
locations are  3 1 * = a  and  1 *= b . The second part of Proposition is demonstrated in the 
same way. Maximize the profit functions in (D,U) of Table 1. It follows: 
16 ) 3 2 )( 2 ( b a b a t a
A + − − + + = ∂ Π ∂  and  8 ) 3 2 )( 2 ( b a b a t b
B − + − − = ∂ Π ∂ . The 
first equation is always negative: therefore, firm A has always the incentive to move to 
the left, that is,  0 = a . Substitute into the second equation and solve. There are two 
solutions:  3 2 = b  and  2 = b . Since the second solution is impossible (b  cannot be 
higher than 1) the unique equilibrium locations are  0 * = a  and  3 2 * = b .                      ■                             
 
Since we have the equilibrium prices (third stage) and the equilibrium locations 
(second stage) in all possible cases, we can write the equilibrium profits of each firm 
directly as functions of the decision whether to commit or not taken at the first stage of 















U  2 t ; 2 t   27 4t ; 27 8t  
D  27 8t ; 27 4t   8 t ; 8 t  
 
The next proposition follows directly from Table 2: 
 
Proposition 8: in game 2, the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium is given by (U,U), 
0 *= a  and  1 * = b , and  c t p p
B A
+ = = * * . 
 
Perhaps surprisingly, if the location decision is taken once the decisions regarding 
the commitment have been already taken, there exists a (unique) sub-game perfect 
equilibrium in which both firms commit. On the contrary, when the decision whether to 
commit or not is taken after the location decision, the equilibrium is characterized by 
price discrimination by both firms (and, consequently, by lower profits). However, if 
one takes into account the different forces working in the two games, such a result has 
an intuitive explanation. The main difference between a commitment strategy and a 
non-commitment strategy is that the former reduces the flexibility of a firm in setting 
prices: when a firm has committed, it can choose its price schedule only from a subset 
of the complete price schedules set (namely, the subset composed by the uniform price 
schedules). Therefore, there is no reason for a firm to choose to commit if the only 
consequence of the commitment is to reduce its own flexibility in setting prices. This is 
exactly what happens in game 1. The decision whether to commit or not affects only the 
decision regarding the price(s) to be set. When each firm announces that in the future it 
will not price discriminate, the locations have been already fixed, and therefore they 
cannot be modified by any commitment decision. The only consequence for a firm that 
decides to commit is to reduce its own ability to undercut the rival for each consumer: it 
is obvious that no firm would find it convenient, and the dominant strategy for each 
firm necessarily is no-commitment. This is what has been obtained also by Thisse and 
Vives (1988) in their two-stage model with exogenous locations: “there is a robust 
tendency for a firm to choose the discriminatory policy since it is more flexible and does   17
better against any generic strategy of the rival, although…firms may end up worse off 
than if they choose to price uniformly” (pag. 134).   
Why this does not occur in game 2? The timing is different: in this case the location 
is set after the decision regarding the commitment. This implies that the decision 
regarding whether to commit or not has an impact on the locations chosen by the firms. 
The locations of the firms in turn determine the equilibrium prices and the equilibrium 
profits. The more the firms are differentiated, the higher is their market power, and, 
consequently, the higher is the equilibrium price. It is precisely the impact of the 
commitment decision on the equilibrium degree of differentiation that makes the 
commitment decision more profitable for each firm, even if it reduces the flexibility in 
setting prices. Each firm anticipates that its own commitment not to price discriminate 
induces an higher equilibrium degree of differentiation in any case: when the rival 
chooses to commit, deciding to commit too allows to obtain the maximum degree of 
differentiation; if the rival chooses not to commit, deciding to commit allows to obtain 
an higher degree of differentiation than in the situation in which both firms do not 
commit
9. Inducing higher differentiation is profitable for both firms, even if such higher 
differentiation is obtained at the cost of losing the flexibility in setting prices guaranteed 
by the no-commitment strategy. In this model the benefits from the higher 
differentiation outweigh the costs from the reduced flexibility, and therefore 
commitment is convenient for each firm and for any possible decision by the rival. That 
is, the dominant strategy of each firm is committing to uniform pricing. This in turn 
induces a uniform price equilibrium, which is characterized by higher profits. 
Summing up, in game 2 the decision whether to commit or not determines the 
equilibrium differentiation between the firms. Taking no commitment induces lower 
differentiation, which in turn damages both firms through lower profits. Anticipating 
this fact, each firm has the incentive to commit in the first stage of the game, and the 
equilibrium is characterized by no discrimination. On the contrary, when the 
commitment is decided after the location stage, the degree of differentiation between the 
firms is given. Therefore, the incentive to commit disappears, while is still present the 
                                                 
9 When both firms commit, the equilibrium distance between the firms is 1 (Proposition 1); if one firm 
commits not  to price discriminate while the other does not, the equilibrium distance is  3 2 (Proposition 
7); when both firms do not commit, the equilibrium distance is  2 1 (Proposition 3).   18
incentive to not commit, linked to the competition on prices at the last stage of the 





Using the Hotelling’s model (1929) with endogenous locations, we study the 
location-price equilibrium when firms can perfectly price discriminate. If firms cannot 
commit not to price discriminate before competing on price, price discrimination 
emerges as the unique sub-game perfect equilibrium and firms locate respectively at 1/4 
and 3/4 (Propositions 2 and 3). Equilibrium first-degree discriminatory prices are all 
lower than the equilibrium uniform price of a two-stage location-price game where price 
discrimination is impossible (Proposition 4). If firms can commit not to price 
discriminate before competing on price but after locating in the market, the unique 
equilibrium is characterized by price discrimination (Proposition 6). On the contrary, if 
firms can commit not to price discriminate before competing on price and before 
locating in the market, the unique equilibrium is characterized by uniform pricing 
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